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Operation IA Feature
Operation IA Feature, a covert Central Intelligence Agency operation, authorized U.S. government support for Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and Holden Roberto's National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) militants in the Angolan Civil War. It was closely linked with parallel efforts by South Africa (''Operation Savannah'') and Zaire. President Gerald Ford approved the program on July 18, 1975 despite strong opposition from officials in the State Department and the CIA. The program's discovery shocked Congress into barring further U.S. involvement in Angola's Civil War through the Clark Amendment.〔Andrew, Christopher M. ''For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush'', 1995. Page 412.〕〔Richard H. Immerman and Athan G. Theoharis. ''The Central Intelligence Agency: Security Under Scrutiny'', 2006. Page 325.〕
Ford told William Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, to "go ahead and do it," with an initial USD $6 million in funding. He granted an additional $8 million in funding on July 27 and another $25 million in August.〔
==Criticism==
Two days prior to the program's approval Nathaniel Davis, the Assistant Secretary of State, told Henry Kissinger, the United States Secretary of State, that he believed maintaining the secrecy of IA Feature would be impossible. Davis correctly predicted the Soviet Union would respond by increasing its involvement in Angola, leading to more violence and negative publicity for the United States. When Ford approved the program Davis resigned.〔Brown, Seyom. ''The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton'', 1994. Page 303.〕 John Stockwell, the CIA's station chief in Angola, echoed Davis' criticism saying the program needed to be expanded to be successful, but the program was already too large to be kept out of the public eye. Davis' deputy and former U.S. ambassador to Chile, Edward Mulcahy, also opposed direct involvement. Mulcahy presented three options for U.S. policy towards Angola on May 13, 1975. Mulcahy believed the Ford administration could use diplomacy to campaign against foreign aid to the Communist People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), refuse to take sides in factional fighting, or increase support for the FNLA and UNITA. He warned however that supporting UNITA would not sit well with Mobutu Sese Seko, the ruler of Zaire.〔〔Jussi HanhimÄki and Jussi M. Hanhim̀eaki. ''The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy'', 2004. Page 408.〕
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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